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7 
MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY                      
OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
David Korn, M.D.* 
Historians tell us that science arose in the western world under 
the moniker of “experimental philosophy” and that, at its birth, 
science was inseparably conjoined with integrity. This inseparable 
conjunction took root in the fact that experimental philosophy was 
an activity exclusively practiced by “gentlemen,” whose word was 
deemed their bond and whose devotion to the ideals of loyalty and 
honor was considered unshakeable. Quaint though this notion may 
now appear, it is instructive to note that, in 1968, some 300 to 400 
years later, Stanford University’s then remarkably terse policy on 
faculty outside consulting relationships was captured in the 
following language: 
Most major universities, including Stanford, have taken the 
position that consulting relationships are on balance 
overwhelmingly beneficial, and there is no disposition to 
change that view. At the same time, it would be foolish to 
ignore the fact that some of the complications arising from 
this state of affairs can cause damage to the university and 
to the individual, as well. Chief among these complications 
is that tangled and thorny set of problems embraced by the 
general title of ‘conflict of interest.’ 
The issues subsumed under that heading are principally 
ethical and as such they are not readily codified to rules of 
behavior. In any event, this university has never found it 
necessary to spell out the rules or codes of ethics for its 
faculty and staff. The relationship between the university 
                                                          
 * Senior Vice President, Division of Biomedical and Health Sciences 
Research, Association of American Medical Colleges; Stanford University Vice 
President, Dean of Medicine and Professor of Pathology, emeritus. 
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and its staff assumes that full-time staff members owe their 
primary professional allegiance to the University and that 
they will be alert to the possibility that outside obligations, 
financial interests, or employment can affect the objectivity 
of their decisions as members of the University community. 
If those assumptions are valid, as we believe them to be, 
then no codes or monitoring devices are needed; if they are 
not valid, then none will suffice.1 
Certainly, academic science has profoundly changed since the 
days of Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, and profoundly so since 
1968, especially in biomedicine. Today neither the organization 
nor the culture of science conforms to the trusting, “gentlemanly” 
code of behavior captured so sparsely and elegantly in Stanford’s 
former policy language. Notwithstanding this reality, I will posit 
that the integrity of science today continues to rest fundamentally 
on the integrity of individual scientists and their institutions. 
Although it is fashionable to think of scientists as “objective,” 
“detached,” or “dispassionate,” the truth is that successful 
scientists are passionate about their work and often become 
committed to particular hypotheses, experimental approaches, and 
the correctness of their results. In recognizing this passion, and in 
part to respond to it, the scientific processes themselves are 
designed to try to protect scientific integrity and mitigate bias. 
Among the methods used are peer review, requiring that findings 
be communicated with sufficient description of methods, materials, 
and data to permit others to attempt to replicate the work, and 
caution in the interpretation of data, which are always susceptible 
to challenge, modification, refutation, or corroboration. 
Replicability plays a particularly important role in confirming the 
validity of scientific observations and interpretations. 
Problematically, the public and the press too often ignore the fact 
that the publication of research, no matter how rigorously peer-
reviewed, is most assuredly not intended to be an attestation of 
verity. 
During the past five decades, there has been enormous growth 
                                                          
1 STANFORD UNIVERSITY, RESEARCH POLICY HANDBOOK (1989) (on file 
with author). 
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of the U.S. scientific enterprise, spurred largely by federal policy 
and largesse. Nowhere has this growth been more dramatic than in 
the field of biomedicine. Although federal sponsors have 
vigorously regulated the expenditures of hundreds of billions of 
dollars of research funds, their regulation of the actual conduct of 
research and the behaviors of researchers has been astonishingly 
light-handed. Thus, during this interval of dramatic growth, the 
matter of institutional integrity has become increasingly important. 
Indeed, in these matters the government has exhibited remarkable 
deference to the cherished autonomy and self-governance of 
awardee universities and academic medical centers. Oversight has 
been accomplished largely through an “assurance” mechanism, 
whereby the awardee institutions assure the federal funders that 
they have put appropriate policies and practices in place and, at 
least implicitly, are diligent in enforcing them. These assurances 
deal with such matters as scientific misconduct, financial conflicts 
of interest, and the protection of human research subjects. 
The assurance edifice, which in many respects defines the 
federal-academic partnership in basic research, is still operational 
today. Notably, however, its foundations began to fray in the early 
1980s and throughout the 1990s due to a number of unfortunate 
and highly publicized episodes that occurred in biomedical 
research. These cases, which cast long shadows on the integrity of 
biomedical researchers and their institutions, involved flagrant 
scientific misconduct. In several of the cases, the perpetrators were 
found to have significant financial interests in the outcomes of 
their research. Thus, both scientific misconduct and financial 
conflicts of interest debuted together on a brightly-lighted public 
stage. However, this linkage was unfortunate because it ingrained 
in the minds of the public that financial self-interests in biomedical 
research are inevitably problematic and likely to lead to scientific 
fraud. 
During the late 1990s, a number of federal reports criticized 
academic medical centers for inadequate compliance with federal 
regulations concerning the protection of human research subjects. 
Several of those reports raised concerns about financial conflicts of 
interest in research institutions, in essence questioning whether the 
“institutional watchdog” was still trustworthy. In November 2000, 
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the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) 
announced its intention to convene a Task Force on Financial 
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research (AAMC Task Force). It 
did so primarily because of the concern that its member 
institutions, which conduct more than 60 percent of the total 
extramural research funded by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), had not been sufficiently responsive to the profound 
changes that had occurred in the past two decades.2 
One can readily identify a number of the most prominent 
factors responsible for these changes. First, of course, has been the 
extraordinary progress of biomedical science, which has made the 
results of even the most fundamental research increasingly 
attractive candidates for commercial development and clinical 
application. Second was the invention in academia of recombinant 
DNA technology, which spawned the biotechnology industry, the 
scientific agenda of which continues to be deeply intertwined with 
academic biomedical research and researchers. The invention of 
recombinant DNA technology by Professors Cohen (Stanford) and 
Boyer (UCSF) in the early 1970s is well known, as is the deep 
intertwining of academic biomedical and biotech industry research. 
A third factor was the 1980 case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a recombinant 
bacterium was patentable subject matter.3 The Court stated in its 
opinion that “anything under the sun” invented by man is 
patentable.4 By sweeping living organisms under the reach of 
patentability, the Court deemed a vast expanse of biomedical 
research and technology eligible for intellectual property 
protection, an expanse whose boundaries continue to expand and 
be hotly contested to this day. A fourth factor was the enactment of 
the Bayh-Dole Act, also in 1980, which gives the recipients of 
federal research funds both the right to patent their discoveries and 
the obligation to spur translation of those discoveries into public 
benefit, that is, to stimulate the commercialization of federally-
                                                          
2 I like to refer to this period as the ecology of biomedical research. 
3 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
4 Id. at 309 (internal citations omitted). 
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funded research results.5 
Yet another factor has been the storied accomplishments of 
Silicon Valley, MA Route 128, and the San Francisco Bay Area in 
informatics and biotechnology. These successes have reached near-
mythic proportions in the minds of local, state, and federal 
politicians—all of them eager to bring similar bounties to their 
communities through the commercialization of university research. 
Thus, America’s research universities have become increasingly 
viewed as “engines of economic development” and have found 
themselves ensnarled in a tangled web of intensely conflicted 
political pressures and public expectations. 
As a consequence of all of these factors, the breadth, depth, and 
intensity of interaction between universities and their biomedical 
research staff and industry has increased dramatically, as has the 
prevalence of individual and institutional financial self-interest in 
academic biomedical research. Some alarmed observers have 
opined that science is facing a veritable pandemic of financial 
conflicts of interest; others have questioned whether academia is 
busily bartering its very soul for the prospect of material 
enrichment. 
In response to these concerns, AAMC convened a Task Force 
                                                          
5 Government Patent Policy Act of 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), 35 USC §§ 200-
211 (2004). The Act provides in relevant part: 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to 
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported 
research or development; to encourage maximum participation of small 
business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; 
to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit 
organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions made by 
nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner 
to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly 
encumbering future research and discovery; to promote the 
commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the 
United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the 
Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions 
to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against 
nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of 
administering policies in this area. 
Id. § 200. 
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that produced two reports that address individual and institutional 
financial self-interests, respectively.6 The reports are noteworthy in 
that they reflect the hard-won consensus of a highly diverse group 
of leaders representing all of the stakeholder groups, including 
academia, industry, bioethics, law, patients, and media 
representatives. The reports offer principles, recommendations, 
and guidelines that are stringent and challenging. They would hold 
academic medical centers to high standards that the AAMC 
believes would contribute greatly to buttressing public confidence 
in the integrity and trustworthiness of academic medical centers 
and the research they produce. 
The AAMC recently reported the results of a year-long survey 
study that it conducted to assess the current state of financial 
conflict of interest policies at U.S. medical schools.7 The 
participation of 82 percent of the schools makes this study the most 
comprehensive exploration of this topic to date. The report 
indicates that the medical schools and their parent universities have 
made encouraging progress in revising and strengthening their 
policies and practices in accordance with the recommendations of 
the AAMC Task Force.8 At the same time, however, the study 
reveals many areas in which continued effort is necessary to ensure 
that all medical schools engaged in clinical research on human 
subjects maintain a consistently high standard of disclosure of 
financial self-interests. For example, the schools must continue to 
press for the adoption and credible application of the “compelling 
circumstances” threshold regarding the permitted participation of 
financially-conflicted scientists in clinical research, and for 
                                                          
6 See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, PROTECTING 
SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING PROGRESS (2001), available at 
http://www.aamc.org/members/coitf/firstreport.pdf [hereinafter REPORT I]; 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES (2002), PROTECTING 
SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING PROGRESS II, available at 
http://www.aamc.org/members/coitf/2002coireport.pdf [hereinafter REPORT II]. 
7 SUSAN EHRINGHAUS & DAVID KORN, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN 
MEDICAL COLLEGES, U.S. MEDICAL SCHOOL POLICIES ON INDIVIDUAL 
FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2004), available at http://www.aamc.org/ 
members/coitf/coiresults2003.pdf. 
8 Id. at 5-6. 
KORN MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC 3/8/2005 12:37 PM 
 SCIENTIFIC CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 13 
rigorous management to ensure that financial interests are never 
allowed to compromise the integrity of the research or the welfare 
of the human subjects.9 
The AAMC has devoted considerable attention to the matter of 
financial conflicts of interest during the past fifteen years because 
of its conviction that academic medicine should demonstrate strong 
and unambiguous moral leadership in biomedical research (and 
medical practice, for that matter) to remain worthy of the 
remarkable trust and esteem placed in it by the American public. 
To this point, there persists a major area of concern that has 
troubled some academic medical leaders and journal editors for 
many years and, in recent months, has become the focus of 
enormous public attention and alarm—the integrity of reporting of 
the results of industry-sponsored clinical trials. Although the 
principal targets of concern are pharmaceutical companies and, 
regrettably, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), academic 
medicine is also implicated because so many influential clinical 
trials are conducted by academic specialists of high repute. These 
“thought leaders” bring to the trial, and especially to the 
publication of trial results in prestigious medical journals, not only 
their expertise but also their credibility as academics. 
Although this interaction between academic medical experts 
and industry is scientifically and clinically understandable, and 
indeed may be necessary for a successful study, serious concerns 
have been raised about just how involved the academic principal 
investigators really may be in such critically important tasks as the 
design of the trial, primary data analysis and interpretation, and 
even at times the writing of the paper itself. In other words, too 
many documented instances suggest that academic leaders 
sometimes permit themselves to be used to provide cover and 
respectability to industry-sponsored studies in return for potentially 
rich financial rewards. It is worth emphasizing that the AAMC 
Task Force reports urge medical schools and teaching hospitals to 
                                                          
9 Id. at 6-7. The Task Force argued that a financially-conflicted investigator 
should be permitted to participate in clinical research only in the presence of 
“compelling circumstances.” Id. at 3. Although the Task Force declined to 
define “compelling,” it believed that a useful standard would be that the research 
in question could not be carried out as effectively or safely by anyone else. Id. 
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adopt a strong posture against permitting such financially-
conflicted practices.10 
The present crisis of credibility is due in part to company 
sponsors ignoring or suppressing the publication of negative trial 
results and choosing instead to publish positive results, thereby 
presenting to practicing physicians and the public a highly 
misleading picture of the efficacy and safety of the drugs in 
question. Questions have even been raised about whether the FDA 
itself, presumably under industry pressure, has been guilty of such 
suppression of negative data. Given the FDA’s statutory role as the 
federal watchdog over the purity, safety, and efficacy of nearly 25 
percent of the gross national product of the United States, such 
allegations are extremely troubling. As a result, several state 
attorneys general, especially New York Attorney General Elliott 
Spitzer, have played a major role in bringing these grievous 
matters to light by filing charges of criminal fraud, exacting high 
financial penalties, and imposing corrective practices on the 
accused company perpetrators. 
The present crisis, which focused initially on the use of heavily 
marketed anti-depressant drugs in children and, more recently, on 
the purported efficacy and safety of new generation anti-
inflammatory drugs (“cox-II inhibitors”), has created great 
pressure for the establishment of a federally funded and operated 
mandatory registry of all clinical trials. Although the 
implementation of such a registry is not so simple a task as the 
media and some congresspersons would like to believe, both the 
AAMC and the American Medical Association (AMA) have lent 
their strong endorsements to this initiative. 
Two facts are often overlooked in public discussions of 
financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research. First, the 
extraordinarily generous public investment in biomedical research 
in the post-World War II decades has not been driven by scientific 
curiosity or the abstract goal of enriching scientific knowledge. 
Rather, that investment has been driven by the hope and 
expectation that diseases will be better understood, that preventive 
and therapeutic interventions will be more rational and effective, 
                                                          
10 See REPORT I & REPORT II supra note 6. 
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and that from all of this will come dramatic reductions in suffering 
and improvements in the public health. Second, in our political 
economy, which frowns on “industrial planning,” the commercial 
development of scientific discoveries is, with the singular 
exception of the defense industry, almost exclusively dependent on 
private capital. It is important to keep in mind that the NIH 
research dollar, with precious few exceptions, stops at discovery; 
therefore, partnering among academic institutions, venture capital, 
and industry is an inevitable and necessary step in bringing the 
fruits of biomedical research to market. 
Given these facts, the challenge for the academic medical 
community is to oversee and manage the inevitable financial self-
interests with stringent policies, scrupulous practices, and a strong 
presumption against permitting a financially-conflicted 
investigator to participate in clinical research on human subjects, 
unless a compelling case can be made that the research could not 
be performed as effectively or as safely by anyone else. 
Compelling circumstances do indeed exist; nonetheless, the broad 
acceptance of such a standard would dramatically reduce the 
number of instances in which such practices occur as well as the 
unfortunate misbehaviors that too often result. With that said, 
proposers of new remedies that call for the blanket elimination of 
financial conflicts of interest should take care that, in their zeal to 
attain some idealized state of virtue, they do not interdict a robust 
developmental pathway of immense social benefit and 
coincidentally kill the goose that lays the golden egg that supports 
biomedical research discovery and its realization for public benefit. 
